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CCF common cause failure 
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IEF initiating event frequency 
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MOV motor operated valve 
MV manual valve 
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PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
psid pounds per square inch differential 
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 
RCP reactor coolant pump 
rcry reactor-critical-year 
RCS reactor coolant system 
RHR residual heat removal 
ry reactor-year 
SOKC state of knowledge correlation 
TO transfers open 
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I – Internship presentation  
 
1) Context 
This project has been developed during my internship in the field of Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA) in the offices of Westinghouse. These are in the enclosure of 
Vandellòs’ Nuclear Plant in Hospitalet de l'Infant. 
The goal of my internship was the modelling and computation of the frequency that an 
Interfacing System Loss of Coolant Accident (ISLOCA) occurs in the nuclear power 
plants of Vandellòs and Ascó. 
In order to achieve this goal, I applied a method to calculate ISLOCA risk frequency 
(WCAP-17154-P) proposed in august 2013 by Westinghouse, to the nuclear plants of 
Ascó and Vandellòs. 
2) Objectives of the project 
 
The objective of this report is to illustrate realistically the procedure followed during the 
internship in order to assess the ISLOCA risk frequency. Considering that all 
information necessary to perform these assessments for the plants is strictly 
confidential, the illustration of the procedure will be done over a generic 
Westingouse PWR three loop reactor, using generic data publicly available 
or proprietary of Westinghouse. 
 
3) Presentation of the internship 
a) Westinghouse Electric 
Westinghouse Electric Company is an American company founded by George 
Westinghouse in 1886 under the name of Westinghouse Electric Company. It was bought 
in 2006 by the Japanese company Toshiba. Its core activity is nuclear power. 
It operates in the areas of : 
- design and manufacture of nuclear fuel assemblies,  
- specialized industry services  
- associated engineering, design and construction of new nuclear plants. 
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b) Vandellòs and Ascò 
The two nuclear power plants are operated by the Asco-Vandellòs Nuclear Association 
(ANAV) which is owned by Endesa and Iberdrola. 
 
i) Vandellòs 
Initially in the site of Vandellòs there were two Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) ; but today 
only one of them works. It is located in the town of L'Hospitalet de l'Infant in the province 
of Tarragona in Spain, on the Mediterranean Seacoast.  
 
Vandellòs I 
The first reactor, Vandellòs I, was built in 1967 using the French technology: natural 
uranium, gas and graphite. It began its operations in 1972 with an electrical output of 480 
MW. A fire in the turbine happened in October 1989. The high cost of repair led to the 
closure of this reactor. Today, the reactor is in the process of nuclear decommissioning. 
 
Vandellòs II   
The construction of this reactor started in 1981 and commercial operations began in 1988. 
It is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) with an electrical output of 1087 MW. 
72% of the plant belongs to Endesa and 28% to Iberdrola. 
 
ii) Ascó 
Asco NPP also has two reactors and is located in the province of Tarragona, Spain, on the 
bank of the Ebro river. It has two pressurized water reactor (PWR). The first has a capacity 
of 1032.5 MW, and the other of 1027.2 MW. The first reactor began its operations in 
1984 and the second one in 1986. 
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c) PWR technology 
The Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) is the type of reactors the most used around the 
world. It uses water as coolant and as moderator, thus it is a light water reactor. The water 
in the primary system – which cools the reactor core – is under a high pressure and cannot 
boil. The vapor in the 
secondary system is 
produced through the 
steam generators.  
The PWR nuclear fuel 
is enriched uranium: 
the proportion of the 
isotope U-235 varies 
from 2 to 5% depending 
on the country. The fuel are piled pellets in fuel rods made out of zircaloy .Those rods are 
maintained together in fuel assemblies that are directly loaded into the reactor core. 
In the primary system, water is in charge of extracting the heat produced by the core: it is 
the coolant that circulates within the fuel assemblies between the rods where the nuclear 
reaction takes place. The fission products resulting from the nuclear reaction are confined 
with the uranium inside the rods in order to avoid the contamination of the primary. 
The water of the primary is also the moderator and has the capacity to slow down the 
neutrons responsible for the fission. 
The heat is transferred from the primary to the secondary thanks to the steam generator. 
The pressurized steam created in the steam generator goes through the turbines enabling 
them to turn and create electricity. 
Like in most thermal reactors, a PWR is cooled down by a high cold water flow pumped 
from a river or a sea which represents the cold source of water in the thermodynamic 
cycle. 
 
A PWR is composed of many different systems that have various functions. Two of them 
will be studied in this report: the residual heat removal system and the component cooling 
system. 
Table 1 – Simplified diagram of a PWR 
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The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system is used to cool the primary system during and 
following the shutdown of the reactor whereas the Component Cooling System cools heat 
exchangers. 
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II – Definitions and basic notions of PSA  
 
1) Objectives 
The objective of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis is not to know what happens, but rather 
what could happen. Therefore, the use of analytic techniques (safety analysis) is 
inevitable. The goal is to obtain the sequences of events that lead to a severe damage and 
to quantify the associated risk. It is the method used to check that the frequencies of given 
accidents comply with the limits established by the law. 
The frequency of different damage states are quantified according to the three following 
levels: 
 Level 1: Expected frequency of Core Damage 
 Level 2: Expected frequency of Fission Products escape outside the containment 
 Level 3: External consequences (damage to the public, property and 
environment 
In the case of my studies, level 1 is considered. 
 
2) Initiating event 
After a systematic familiarization with the plant design, system layout and operations, the 
first task was the selection of initiating events. They are any unexpected disturbance 
leading to an operational incident or accident affecting the safety of the plant.  
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3) ISLOCA 
In our case, the initiating event is an ISLOCA.  
An ISLOCA (Interfacing System Loss of Coolant Accident) is an accidental loss of 
reactor coolant outside of the containment building. It is generally due to an 
over-pressurization and the rupture of low pressure pipes which penetrates the 
containment and that are connected to the reactor cooling system. 
The characteristics of an ISLOCA according to the WCAP are the following: 
 The pathway connected to the Reactor Coolant System penetrates the containment 
 A failure of a high-low pressure interface in the pathway occurs 
 Reactor coolant is released outside of the containment  
 It may only occur when the plant is at power 
 It must have a significant risk to the plant safety 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Example of ISLOCA 
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4) Boolean algebra 
Fault Trees describe a given failure by combination gates. 
The operators AND, OR and NOT are combined and quantified by means of the 
Boolean Algebra rules. They respect the following truth tables: 
“A and B”: A.B 
AND A=1 A=0 
B=1 1 0 
B=0 0 0 
 
“A or B”: A+B 
OR A=1 A=0 
B=1 1 1 
B=0 1 0 
 
“Not A”: ?̅? 
NOT A=1 A=0 
 0 1 
 
The Boolean properties resulting from these truth tables are the following: 
 Operation with constants: 
𝐴 + 1 = 1 
𝐴 + 0 = 𝐴 
 Idempotence: 
𝐴 + 𝐴 = 𝐴 
𝐴. 𝐴 = 𝐴 
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 Double negation: 
?̿? = 𝐴 
 
 Absorption: 
𝐴 + 𝐴. 𝐵 = 𝐴 
𝐴. (𝐴 + 𝐵) = 𝐴 
 
 Annihilation:  
𝐴 + ?̅? = 1 
𝐴. ?̅? = 0 
 
 Morgan’s Relationships: 
𝐴 + 𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ?̅?. ?̅? 
𝐴. 𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ?̅? + ?̅? 
 
The gates are depicted as follows: 
OR 
 
AND 
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5) Fault trees 
A fault tree is a deductive process using Boolean algebra to identify and quantify the 
causes of a complex undesired event. This event is at the top of the tree. The principle is 
to define the successive levels of the events such that each one is a consequence of one 
or more events of the lower level. Logical operators (or doors) allow a precise definition 
of the links between events of different levels. The deductive process is pursued level by 
level until it is no longer necessary to decompose the events in combinations of lower-
level events, particularly because their probabilities are quantified. These events are 
called basic events. 
 
6) Basic events 
A basic event is the probability that a component fails to perform its intended task. It can 
either be the failure or the unavailability of a component, a human reliability event or a 
consequence of operation. 
The failure of a component is the probability that a component does not perform its 
intended mission due to random causes. There are two different types of failures:  
- Random failures which are the failures on demand, failures to load/run, failures 
to run and standby failures 
- Common Cause Failures which are failures of two or more components in a short 
space of time induced by the same cause (environment, constructor, equipment...). 
Common cause failures are major contributors of risks in a plant but are 
exceptional events. 
 
Failure on demand: probability 
𝑃 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠
 
 
 
Failure to run (time model), failure rate (per hour) 
𝑃 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑅𝑢𝑛 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
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The unavailability of a component is the probability that a component does not perform 
its intended mission because it is purposefully out of service due to maintenance 
unavailability (preventive, corrective) or test and surveillance unavailability. 
Maintenance unavailability is quantified as an average 
𝑈 =
𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
 
 
The data are taken from the industry. In fact each type of failure or unavailability follows 
a certain distribution, usually beta or gamma. 
 
7) Cut set 
A cut set is the succession of basic events necessary for the initiating event to happen. 
 
8) Reading a fault tree 
Figure 2 below illustrates the construction of a fault tree. 
 
Figure 2 - Construction of a fault tree 
Jean-Baptiste FAVRE – Internship Report – October 2014 - February 2015   15 
 
The symbols necessary to understand a fault tree are listed in the following table. 
Table 2 - Symbols in a fault tree 
Basic event 
A basic event is represented 
with a circle under the 
description and the ID of the 
event 
 
Gate event 
OR gate 
 
AND gate 
 
Transfer gate: The event is a 
top event of another fault tree.  
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9) Elements of probability theory  
All of the following concepts are necessary in order to understand the logic of the fault 
trees. 
If A is an event, its probability is written: 𝑃(𝐴) and 0 ≤ 𝑃(𝐴) ≤ 1 . 
Union – OR gate: 
Principle of Inclusion and Exclusion for Probability 
For any events 𝐴𝑖 with 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁:  
𝑃 (⋃ 𝐴𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
) = ∑(−1)𝑘 ∑ 𝑃 (⋂ 𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑖𝑘
𝑖𝑗=1
)
𝑖1,𝑖2,…,𝑖𝑘:
1≤𝑖1≤𝑖2≤⋯≤𝑖𝑘≤𝑁
𝑁
𝑘=1
 
If all of the events 𝐴𝑖 are independent: 
𝑃 (⋃ 𝐴𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
) = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Intersection – AND gate: 
If all of the events 𝐴𝑖 are independent: 
𝑃 (⋂ 𝐴𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Conditional probability 
With A and B, two events 
𝑃(𝐴/𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵)
𝑃(𝐵)
 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) =  𝑃(𝐴/𝐵)𝑃(𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐵/𝐴)𝑃(𝐴) 
For independent events 
𝑃(𝐴/𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) 
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) =  𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵) 
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Bayes Theorem 
E any event 
𝐻𝑖 with 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, 
𝑃(𝐻𝑖/E) =
𝑃(E/𝐻𝑖)𝑃(𝐻𝑖)
∑ 𝑃(𝐸/𝐻𝑖)𝑃(𝐻𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
10) Limits of PSA 
The probabilistic safety assessment is not a perfect science and is criticized on several 
different aspects. 
First, it is impossible to model a perfectly accurate fault tree since it is not conceivable to 
predict all the failures and all the common-cause failures of all the possible scenarios, 
especially for the beyond design basis accidents.  
Second, modeling human actions and their impacts on all types of failure modes is far 
from being authentic. 
Third, the data used for the failures are just experimental values. Moreover, some data for 
given types of failures that may happen but yet has never occurred have estimated values. 
They may be totally erroneous. Furthermore, the common cause failure values are not 
always coherent or at least intuitive. Indeed, the failure of three identical valves in series 
can have a greater value than the failure probability of only two of them. This fact 
contradicts the redundancy safety theory. 
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III – Method applied to obtain the ISLOCA frequency 
 
1) Introduction  
 
The Interfacing Systems Loss of Coolant Accident refers to a Loss of Coolant Accident 
outside of the containment in a line connected to the reactor coolant system. This type of 
accident can challenge the safety of the plant since the RCS inventory may decrease 
significantly, leading to the incapacity of the coolant to sufficiently cool down the core. 
Moreover the losses of coolant are outside containment which means a potential fission 
product release to the atmosphere. 
The ISLOCA is typically initiated by the failure of several components in a same line 
connected to the RCS that penetrates the containment and involves low pressure piping 
outside containment. The failure of the high/low pressure interface at full power would 
result in the over-pressurization and the rupture of a low pressure piping or the opening 
of a relief valve outside containment.  
 
In order to compute the ISLOCA frequency in a given nuclear power plant, the document 
WCAP-17154-P suggests a systematic methodology. The first task is to identify the 
containment penetrations through which an ISLOCA is possible. Once identified, the 
second task is to determine the combinations of component failures and operator errors 
that will result in an ISLOCA. The final task is to determine the ISLOCA frequency 
associated with each identified scenario. 
 
In this part all the different steps applied will be explained with further details.  
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2) Identification of Containment Penetrations Requiring Further 
Analysis 
 
Each containment penetration should be reviewed in order to determine if it is a potential 
ISLOCA pathway. As stated in WCAP-17154-P potential ISLOCA pathways must have 
the following features: 
 The pathway connected to the Reactor Coolant System penetrates the containment 
 A failure of a high-low pressure interface in the pathway occurs 
 Reactor coolant is released outside of the containment  
 It may only occur when the plant is at power 
 It must have a significant risk to the plant safety 
 
 
Moreover WCAP-17154-P suggests that, if the penetration possesses any one of the 
following screening attributes, it can be screened out from further consideration: 
 The pathway is not connected to the reactor coolant system 
 The pathway does not have a high-low pressure interface. (This assumes that high 
pressure pipes cannot break) 
 The pipe has an inner diameter smaller than 3/8th of an inch. 
 
3) Studies of Potential ISLOCA Pathways 
 
After screening out all of the non-potential ISLOCA pathways, in a typical PWR, only 
the five following lines should be reviewed: 
 Aspiration pumps RHR 
 Discharge pumps RHR Cold Leg 
 Discharge pumps RHR Hot Leg 
 Return of the water cooling the thermal barriers 
 Injection of the water cooling the thermal barriers 
 
The following systems and assumptions are fictitious but could be similar to the case of 
a typical PWR.   
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a) P-1 – Aspiration pumps RHR 
 
i) Drawing 
 
Figure 3 - Aspiration pumps RHR pathway diagram 
ii) Description 
 Two normally closed and de-energized MOVs in series with one MOV normally 
open connected to a pressure instrument, all inside containment.  
 Pressure instrumentation between MOV12 and MOV11 
 MOV12 and MOV13 are tested after the start-up of the plant. Thus their failure 
to close is not modeled. 
 The MOVs MOV12 and MOV13 are not energized during normal operation 
therefore are considered as manual valves  
 The pressure instrumentation IP11 triggers an alarm in the control room ; thus the 
failure to remain close and transfers open are not considered for the MOV11. 
 The relief valve RV11 is not credited for prevention of piping failure  
 The pump design pressure cannot withstand the pressure of the RCS ; thus it 
would break with a probability of 1 whenever the pressure reaches the RCS 
pressure. 
 
iii) Conditions for an ISLOCA to occur 
An ISLOCA can take place if ALL of the following conditions occur: 
- Failure of the two motorized valves MOV12 and MOV13 
- Failure of the motorized valve MOV11 or of the pressure instrument IP11 
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b) P-2 – Discharge pumps RHR cold Leg 
i) Drawing 
 
Figure 4 - Discharge pumps RHR cold Leg pathway diagram 
ii) Description 
 No pressure instrumentation 
 Three CVs in series  
 One MOV normally open and a relief valve outside containment 
 The valves MOV20/21 cannot be actuated before the ISLOCA takes place 
 CV22/23/24/25/26/27 are tested after the start-up of the plant. Thus their failure 
to close is not modeled. 
 The CVs CV20 and CV21 are not tested after the start-up of the plant. Thus, they 
can fail to close. 
 Note: For conservatism, it is supposed that if the pressure within the tube 
connected to the relief valves RV20 and RV21 exceeds 600 psig these relief valves 
open and the ISLOCA occurs. 
iii) Conditions for an ISLOCA to occur 
An ISLOCA can occur when the following condition occurs: 
- Three CVs in series fail: CV20/22/25, CV20/23/26, CV20/24/27, CV21/22/25, 
CV21/23/26 or CV21/24/27 
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c) P-3 – Discharge pumps RHR Hot Leg 
 
i) Drawing 
 
Figure 5 - Discharge pumps RHR Hot Leg pathway diagram 
ii) Description 
 No pressure instrumentation 
 Two CVs in series inside containment 
 One normally closed and de-energized MOV and a relief valve outside 
containment. 
 The relief valves opens at 600psi. Thus the pipe doesn’t need to break in order for 
an ISLOCA to occur. The normal opening of the valve would cause it.  
 MOV31 and CV31/32/33/34 are tested after the start-up of the plant. Thus their 
failure to close is not modeled. 
 
iii) Conditions for an ISLOCA to occur 
An ISLOCA can occur if ALL of the following conditions exist: 
 - Failure of the two check valves “CV31 and CV33” or “CV32 and CV34” 
 - Failure of the motorized valve MOV31 
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d) P-4 – Return of the water cooling the thermal barriers  
 
i) Drawing 
 
Figure 6 - Return of the water cooling the thermal barriers pathway diagram 
ii) Description 
 Flow instruments FI41/42/43/44 respectively connected to the MOVs 
MOV41/42/43/44 
 One relief valve, two MOVs normally opened connected to flow instruments and 
one MOV normally open in series inside containment 
 MOV40 cannot be closed before the ISLOCA takes place 
 The relief valves RV42/43/44 are not credited for prevention of piping failure. 
 The flow instrumentation gives a signal to close the MOVs they are connected to 
when the flow is higher than a certain value. It is supposed that if the pressure 
increases due to the rupture of the thermal barrier, the flow will increase as well. 
 Common cause failure to close between MOV41 and the motorized valves 
MOV42/43/44 is considered. 
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iii) Conditions for an ISLOCA to occur 
An ISLOCA can take place if ALL of the following conditions occur: 
- Failure of one of the thermal barrier TB42/43/44 and its respective flow 
instrument FI42/43/44 or its respective motorized valve MOV42/43/44 
- Failure of the flow instrument FI41or the motorized valve MOV41 
- Rupture of the pipe outside containment 
 
e) P-5 – Injection of the water cooling the thermal barriers 
 
i) Drawing 
 
Figure 7 - Injection of the water cooling the thermal barriers pathway diagram 
ii) Description 
 No pressure instrumentation 
 Two CVs, one manual valve half opened, one relief valve, one manual valve 
locked open, and one normally opened valve in series inside containment. 
 The relief valves RV51/52/53 are not credited for prevention of piping failure. 
 Common cause failure between the following three groups of two CV is 
considered: CV51/54, CV52/55 and CV53/56. 
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iii) Conditions for an ISLOCA to occur 
An ISLOCA can take place if ALL of the following conditions occur: 
- Failure of one of the thermal barrier TB42/43/44 and its respective CVs in series 
CV51/54, CV52/55 or CV53/56. 
- Rupture of the pipe outside containment 
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4) Quantification of ISLOCA Frequencies 
This section describes the development of the fault trees used for quantification of the 
ISLOCA initiating event frequencies of the potential ISLOCA pathways studied. 
 
1) ISLOCA Frequency Fault Tree Logic 
A total of five fault trees were developed as shown in table 2 to model the ISLOCA for 
the penetrations that required further studies. 
Table 3 - Fault tree names 
Fault Tree Name Description 
ISLOCA P-1.rpp Aspiration pumps RHR 
ISLOCA P-2.rpp Discharge pumps RHR cold Leg 
ISLOCA P-3.rpp Discharge pumps RHR Hot Leg 
ISLOCA P-4.rpp Return of the water cooling the thermal barriers 
ISLOCA P-5.rpp Injection of the water cooling the thermal barriers 
 
The fault trees are depicted graphically in Appendix C. 
 
2) Equipment failure 
Data inputs used in the development of the ISLOCA fault trees identified in the previous 
part are taken from the documents “CEN-35 rev.A” (Spanish data base agreed upon with 
the regulator and based mainly in the NUREG/CR-6928). For the check valve failure 
mode “transfers open” the “large internal leakage” value has been adopted, as WCAP 
suggested. The data of the Common Cause Failures are concerned are taken from the 
NRC “CCF Parameter Estimations 2012” (Reference 4).  
Only the failure modes suggested by WCAP are presented in this section 
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i) Failure modes of Check, motor-operated, manual and relief valves 
The failures of the Check, motor-operated, manual and relief valves are recapitulated in 
table 3:  
Table 4 - Valves' failure modes 
Check Valve 
failure to close 1,04E-04 per demand 
transfers open 2,96E-08 per hour 
Motor-Operated Valve 
failure to close 1,07E-03 per demand 
internal leakage 3,34E-09 per hour 
external leakage 9,84E-10 per hour 
Manual Valve 
failure to close 7,43E-04 per demand 
internal leakage 1,33E-09 per hour 
external leakage 3,12E-09 per hour 
Relief valve failure to open 7,25E-03 per demand 
 
Failure to close takes place when the valve does not close correctly after it has been 
demanded to close. 
Failure to open takes place when the valve does not open correctly when it should have. 
Transfers open and internal leakage take place when the valves that are supposed to be 
closed open. 
 
The only leakages taken into account are the large leakages. Indeed, in the list of all the 
possible failure suggested by WCAP, small leakages do not appear. Small leakages have 
a flow smaller than 50gpm thus it can be compensated by CVCS system which has a 
make-up flow that can reach 50gpm. In this case, the plant safety will be challenged, thus 
no ISLOCA can occur. 
 
Relief valves inside containment were conservatively not credited for prevention of 
piping failure. The capacity of these relief valves may be capable of mitigating pressure 
transients from small amounts of leakage but the ability of these valves to mitigate the 
pressure transient resulting from large leaks into the interfacing system cannot be verified 
and is assumed to be insufficient to prevent piping failure.  
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ii) Thermal Barrier Rupture  
 
An arbitrary value of the thermal Barrier Rupture frequency has been taken. 
𝑓 =  1.93𝐸 − 04 /𝑎 
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iii) Failure mode of the flow and pressure instruments 
The failures of the flow and pressure instruments are recapitulated in the table below:  
Table 5 - flow and pressure instruments' failure modes 
Flow instrumentation Loss of function 1,02E-07 per hour 
Pressure instrumentation Loss of function 8,22E-07 per hour 
 
iv) Human error  
The possible Human errors are recapitulated in the table below:  
Table 6 - Human errors 
Human error of calibration 2,00E-03 per demand 
Human error to close 2,00E-03 per demand 
 
v) Common cause failure 
Common cause failures exist for all failure modes. However, the WCAP only considers 
common cause failures for the failure to close. The data used are taken from the database 
" NRC 11/11/2013 CCF database ". It specifies the number of individual faults and the 
number of common cause failures that have occurred for each failure mode and each type 
of valve. 
 
vi) Pipe rupture  
The rupture probability of one pipe is given by the following formula: 
𝑃𝑖 = ф {
𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝑃
𝐹𝑖
)
𝛽𝑖
} 
where, 
𝑃𝑖 is the pipe rupture probability 
ф{ } is the normal Gaussian distribution  
𝐿𝑃 is the local internal pressure (over pressurization pressure) 
𝐹𝑖 is the rupture pressure 
𝛽𝑖 are the uncertainties associated to 𝐹𝑖 
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The total rupture probability of the low pressure system is calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝑃𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
For the studies of Vandellòs and Ascó the pipes’ ruptures were conservatively always 
considered outside containment. For the computation all the pipes outside or partly 
outside containment were taken into account. 
In those studies, considering that with this formula the probability of failure of low 
pressure pipes were close to 1, a value of 1 has been used for every case. 
 
5) Impossible cut sets 
The model logic which represents the ISLOCA initiating event frequency may generate 
invalid cut sets. These cut sets must not be taken into account. Thus they are removed 
manually from the list of the cut sets given by Riskspectrum during the analysis. The cut 
sets taking into account the common cause failure of components, with components the 
failure of which is not necessary for an ISLOCA to occur, are as well eliminated. 
(example: for the pathway passing through penetration P-4, if the thermal barrier TB44 
and the flow instrument FI44 fail, taking into account the common cause failure to close 
of the motor operated valves MOV41 and MOV42 implies the failure of MOV42 which 
is not necessary for an ISLOCA to occur. Thus this cut set has been screened out.) 
A list of all the possible cut sets is given in Appendix A. 
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6) State Of Knowledge Correlation Correction 
WCAP assumes that the software used to compute the top event frequency do not take 
into account the following fact: the mean frequency of the product of two dependent 
events that have the same distribution will be greater than the product of the mean 
frequency of the same two independent events. 
According to WCAP whenever the same failures occur to identical components, these 
failures are not independent, thus the cut set in which those two failures occur should be 
multiplied by a coefficient called the ‘state of knowledge correlation multiplier’ in order 
to obtain the real mean frequency. 
The state of knowledge correlation multipliers are listed below: 
 
Table 7 - State of Knowlege Coefficents 
 SOKC 
 Moment  2 Moment  3 
Failure Modes 
(2 identical failures  
in a cut set) 
(3 identical failures  
in a cut set) 
Check valve Transfers open 4,33E+00 3,12E+01 
Motor-operated valve Large internal leakage 4,33E+00 3,12E+01 
Motor-operated valve Transfers open 4,33E+00 3,12E+01 
Manual valve Large internal leakage 4,35E+00 3,12E+01 
Check valve failure to close 2,99 15 
Manual valve failure to close 3 14,9 
Motor-operated valve failure to close 1,78 4,56 
 
The cut sets have been studied one by one in order to know which SOKC coefficient to 
multiply it by. A list of all of the combination of component failure to which SOKC 
coefficient should be applied is documented in Appendix B.  
 
For instance, if two check valves fail to close (not for a common cause) on the same 
ISLOCA pathway, the probability of the cut set given by RISKspectrum will be 
multiplied by 2.99. If three Motor operated valves on an ISLOCA pathway leak internally, 
the probability of the cut set will be multiplied by 31.2.  
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7) Conversion from Reactor-Critical-Year to Reactor-Year Basis 
The conversion from Reactor-critical-year to reactor-year basis is done by multiplying 
the result in reactor-critical-year by the plant availability factor (PAF).  
A fictitious value of 0.9 for the PAF has been used for the final ISLOCA frequency 
computations. 
 
 
8) Quantification Summary 
The ISLOCA frequency results for each penetration, after applying all the previous steps 
are summarized in table 7. The total is the sum of all five calculated events. 
 
Table 8 - ISLOCA frequency results 
Penetration ISLOCA Frequency /yr. 
P-1 Aspiration pumps RHR 6,61E-12 
P-2 Discharge pumps RHR cold Leg 3,44E-09 
P-3 Discharge pumps RHR Hot Leg 1,18E-11 
P-4 Return of the water cooling the thermal barriers  4,91E-08 
P-5 Injection of the water cooling the thermal barriers 3,70E-09 
Total 5,63E-08 
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IV – Conclusion 
 
ISLOCA frequency has been analyzed for a generic three loop PWR Westinghouse 
design, using publicly available data and data proprietary of Westinghouse. The analysis 
have been used to illustrate the procedure followed in the assessment of the ISLOCA 
frequency in actual plants. It has been not possible to include the actual plant analysis in 
this report because of confidentiality.  
Although generic, the final result is realistic. Values obtained are reasonably low.  
Indeed an ISLOCA frequency is acceptable as long as it is lower than 10−7/𝑦ear. If we 
had taken into account the common cause of failure for “transfers open” and “internal 
leakage”, the final value would have increased, but yet would have probably remained 
lower than the threshold of 10−7/𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟. Nevertheless, as explained in the section “II.9) 
Limits of PSA”, the results found could be justifiably criticized. 
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V – Personal evaluation 
 
On a personal point of view, this internship was quite enriching. I have had the 
opportunity to work on a project and be supervised by an engineer in a big corporate 
company during five months. The main goal of my internship was to compute 
the ISLOCA frequency to the nuclear power plants of Ascó and Vandellós using 
a new methodology and to compare my results with the previous ones. These five 
months helped me become more familiar with the field of probabilistic safety analysis 
in which we only had a few hours of lectures during the master. 
As an intern, the most difficult part was to get the information I needed, not 
only because I did not have free access to all necessary data and documents, due to 
confidentiality reasons, but also because I didn’t know their existence. 
This internship fulfilled my wish to have a first professional experience abroad in 
an international company. Moreover I had the chance to present the progress of my 
work in front of the PSA team once a month in Spanish. 
To conclude, I have really appreciated this internship and I am once again very grateful 
to the team that I was given the chance to do it in Westinghouse Electric. 
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VI – Appendixes 
 
APPENDIX A – ISLOCA CUT SETS 
P-1 
N° Probability % Event    
1 9,74E-13 6,40E+01 IP11LOF MOV12ILG MOV13AILG RUPT P-1 
2 4,07E-13 2,68E+01 IP11HEC MOV12ILG MOV13AILG RUPT P-1 
3 1,45E-13 9,54E+00 MOV11FTC MOV12ILG MOV13AILG RUPT P-1 
 
P-2 
N° Probability % Event    
1 1,74E-11 1,19E+01 CV21TO CV23TO CV26TO RV21RVO 
2 1,74E-11 1,19E+01 CV20TO CV24TO CV27TO RV20RVO 
3 1,74E-11 1,19E+01 CV21TO CV24TO CV27TO RV21RVO 
4 1,74E-11 1,19E+01 CV20TO CV23TO CV26TO RV20RVO 
5 1,74E-11 1,19E+01 CV20TO CV22TO CV25TO RV20RVO 
6 1,74E-11 1,19E+01 CV21TO CV22TO CV25TO RV21RVO 
7 6,99E-12 4,77E+00 CV20FTC CV22TO CV25TO RV20RVO 
8 6,99E-12 4,77E+00 CV21FTC CV22TO CV25TO RV21RVO 
9 6,99E-12 4,77E+00 CV21FTC CV23TO CV26TO RV21RVO 
10 6,99E-12 4,77E+00 CV20FTC CV23TO CV26TO RV20RVO 
11 6,99E-12 4,77E+00 CV21FTC CV24TO CV27TO RV21RVO 
12 6,99E-12 4,77E+00 CV20FTC CV24TO CV27TO RV20RVO 
 
P-3 
N° Probability % Event    
1 7,83E-13 2,87E+01 CV32TO CV34TO MOV31ILG RV31RVO 
2 7,83E-13 2,87E+01 CV31TO CV33TO MOV31ILG RV31RVO 
3 5,79E-13 2,13E+01 CV32TO CV34TO MOV31ELG  
4 5,79E-13 2,13E+01 CV31TO CV33TO MOV31ELG  
 
P-4 
N° Probability % Event    
1 1,31E-08 2,67E+01 CCF2/2FTC41-44 RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL  
2 1,31E-08 2,67E+01 CCF2/2FTCV41-43 RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL  
3 1,31E-08 2,67E+01 CCF2/2FTC41-42 RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL  
4 1,15E-09 2,33E+00 FI41HEC IF43HEC RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
5 1,15E-09 2,33E+00 FI41HEC IF44HEC RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
6 1,15E-09 2,33E+00 FI41HEC FI42 HEC RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
7 4,09E-10 8,32E-01 IF43HEC MOV41FTC RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
8 4,09E-10 8,32E-01 IF44HEC MOV41FTC RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
9 4,09E-10 8,32E-01 FI42 HEC MOV41FTC RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
10 4,09E-10 8,32E-01 FI41HEC MOV44FTC RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
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11 4,09E-10 8,32E-01 FI41HEC MOV43FTC RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
12 4,09E-10 8,32E-01 FI41HEC MOV42FTC RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
13 3,41E-10 6,95E-01 FI41LOF IF43HEC RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
14 3,41E-10 6,95E-01 FI41HEC IF43LOF RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
15 3,41E-10 6,95E-01 FI41LOF FI42 HEC RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
16 3,41E-10 6,95E-01 FI41HEC IF44LOF RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
17 3,41E-10 6,95E-01 FI41HEC FI42LOF RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
18 3,41E-10 6,95E-01 FI41LOF IF44HEC RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
19 1,46E-10 2,97E-01 MOV41FTC MOV44FTC RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
20 1,46E-10 2,97E-01 MOV41FTC MOV42FTC RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
21 1,46E-10 2,97E-01 MOV41FTC MOV43FTC RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
22 1,22E-10 2,48E-01 FI41LOF MOV43FTC RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
23 1,22E-10 2,48E-01 FI42LOF MOV41FTC RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
24 1,22E-10 2,48E-01 IF44LOF MOV41FTC RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
25 1,22E-10 2,48E-01 FI41LOF MOV44FTC RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
26 1,22E-10 2,48E-01 FI41LOF MOV42FTC RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
27 1,22E-10 2,48E-01 IF43LOF MOV41FTC RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
28 1,02E-10 2,07E-01 FI41LOF IF43LOF RUPT P-4 TB43 FAIL 
29 1,02E-10 2,07E-01 FI41LOF FI42LOF RUPT P-4 TB42 FAIL 
30 1,02E-10 2,07E-01 FI41LOF IF44LOF RUPT P-4 TB44 FAIL 
 
P-5 
N° Probability % Event    
1 1,23E-09 3,33E+01 CCF2/2FTCCV53-56 RUPT P-5 TB44 FAIL  
2 1,23E-09 3,33E+01 CCF2/2FTCCV51-54 RUPT P-5 TB42 FAIL  
3 1,23E-09 3,33E+01 CCF2/2FTCCV52-55 RUPT P-5 TB43 FAIL  
4 1,38E-12 3,74E-02 CV52FTC CV55FTC RUPT P-5 TB43 FAIL 
5 1,38E-12 3,74E-02 CV53FTC CV56FTC RUPT P-5 TB44 FAIL 
6 1,38E-12 3,74E-02 CV51FTC CV54FTC RUPT P-5 TB42 FAIL 
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APPENDIX B - RECOVERY RULES FOR APPLICATION OF 
SOKC FACTORS 
 
P-1 
 
**RECOVERY** SOKC2 ILG MOV  4.33E+00 
MOV12ILG MOV13AILG 
 
P-2 
 
**RECOVERY** SOKC3 TO CV  31.2E+00 
 
CV21TO CV23TO CV26TO 
CV20TO CV24TO CV27TO 
CV21TO CV24TO CV27TO 
CV20TO CV23TO CV26TO 
CV20TO CV22TO CV25TO 
CV21TO CV22TO CV25TO 
 
**RECOVERY** SOKC2 TO CV  4.33E+00 
CV22TO CV25TO 
CV23TO CV26TO 
CV24TO CV27TO 
 
P-3 
**RECOVERY** SOKC2 FTC CV  4.33E+00 
CV32TO CV34TO 
CV31TO CV33TO 
 
P-4 
**RECOVERY** SOKC2 FTC MOV  1.78E+00 
MOV41FTC MOV44FTC 
MOV41FTC MOV42FTC 
MOV41FTC MOV43FTC 
 
P-5 
**RECOVERY** SOKC2 FTC CV 2.99E+00 
 
CV52FTC CV55FTC 
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CV53FTC CV56FTC 
CV51FTC CV54FTC 
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APPENDIX C – FAULT TREES 
 
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve 
CV20
CV20 FAIL
CV20 Transfers open
CV20TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
CV20 Fail to close 
individual
CV20FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV20
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 1
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve 
CV21
CV21 FAIL
CV21 Transfers open
CV21TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
CV21 Fail to close 
individual
CV21FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV21
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 2
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve 
CV22
CV22 FAIL
CV22 Transfers open
CV22TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV22
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 3
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve 
CV23
CV23 FAIL
CV23 Transfers open
CV23TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV23
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 4
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve 
CV24
CV24 FAIL
CV24 Transfers open
CV24TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV24
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 5
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve 
CV25
CV25 FAIL
CV25 Transfers open
CV25TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV25
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 6
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve  
CV26
CV26 FAIL
CV236 Transfers open
CV26TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV26
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 7
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve 
CV27
CV27 FAIL
CV27 Transfers open
CV27TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV27
C:\Users\jalonsom\Desktop\JB\ISLOCA report JB.RPP Page 8
ISLOCA P-3
Failure of the check valve 
CV31
CV31 FAIL
CV31 Transfers open
CV31TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:35 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV31
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ISLOCA P-3
Failure of the check valve 
CV32
CV32 FAIL
CV32 Transfers open
CV32TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV32
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ISLOCA P-3
Failure of the check valve 
CV33
CV33 FAIL
CV33 Transfers open
CV33TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV33
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ISLOCA P-3
Failure of the check valve 
CV34
CV34 FAIL
CV34 Transfers opens
CV34TO
r=2,96E-08  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=2,59E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV34
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ISLOCA P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV51
CV51 FAIL
Common cause failure to 
close CV51-CV54
CCF2/2FTCCV51-54
q=9,62E-06
3
Q=9,62E-06
CV51 Fail to close 
individual
CV51FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV51
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ISLOCA P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV52
CV52 FAIL
CV52 Fail to close 
individual
CV52FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
Common cause failure to 
close CV52-CV55
CCF2/2FTCCV52-55
q=9,62E-06
3
Q=9,62E-06
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV52
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ISLOCA P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV53
CV53 FAIL
CV53 Fail to close 
individual
CV53FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
Common cause failure to 
close CV53-CV56
CCF2/2FTCCV53-56
q=9,62E-06
3
Q=9,62E-06
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV53
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ISLOCA P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV54
CV54 FAIL
CV54 Fail to close 
individual
CV54FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
Common cause failure to 
close CV51-CV54
CCF2/2FTCCV51-54
q=9,62E-06
3
Q=9,62E-06
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV54
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ISLOCA P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV55
CV55 FAIL
CV CV55 Fail to close 
individual
CV55FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
Common cause failure to 
close CV52-CV55
CCF2/2FTCCV52-55
q=9,62E-06
3
Q=9,62E-06
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV55
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ISLOCA P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV56
CV56 FAIL
CV56 Fail to close 
individual
CV56FTC
q=1,04E-04
3
Q=1,04E-04
Common cause failure to 
close CV53-CV56
CCF2/2FTCCV53-56
q=9,62E-06
3
Q=9,62E-06
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE CV56
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the flow 
intrutement  FI41
FI41 FAIL
FI41 Human calibration 
error
FI41HEC
q=3,00E-03
3
Q=3,00E-03
FI41 Loss of function
FI41LOF
r=1,02E-07  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=8,93E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE FI41
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the flow 
intrutement FI42
FI42 FAIL
FI42 Human calibration 
error
FI42 HEC
q=3,00E-03
3
Q=3,00E-03
FI42 Loss of function
FI42LOF
r=1,02E-07  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=8,93E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE FI42
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the flow 
intrutement IF43
IF43 FAIL
IF43 Human calibration 
error
IF43HEC
q=3,00E-03
3
Q=3,00E-03
IF43 Loss of function
IF43LOF
r=1,02E-07  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=8,93E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE FI43
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the flow 
intrutement IF44
IF44 FAIL
IF44 Human calibration 
error
IF44HEC
q=3,00E-03
3
Q=3,00E-03
IF44 Loss of function
IF44LOF
r=1,02E-07  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=8,93E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:36 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE FI44
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ISLOCA P-1
Failure of the pressure 
intrutement IP11
IP11 FAIL
IP11 loss of function
IP11LOF
r=8,22E-07  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=7,17E-03
IP11 Human calibration 
error
IP11HEC
q=3,00E-03
3
Q=3,00E-03
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE IP11
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ISLOCA P-1
Failure of the MOV11
MOV11 FAIL
MOV11 Fail to close 
individual
MOV11FTC
q=1,07E-03
3
Q=1,07E-03
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV11
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ISLOCA P-1
Failure of the de-
energized MOV12
MOV12 FAIL
MOV12 Large internal 
leakage
MOV12ILG
r=1,33E-09  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=1,17E-05
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV12
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ISLOCA P-1
Failure of the de-
energized MOV MOV13
MOV13 FAIL
MOV13 Large internal 
leakage
MOV13AILG
r=1,33E-09  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=1,17E-05
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV13
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ISLOCA P-3
Failure of the de-
energized MOV31
MOV31 FAIL
MOV31 Large internal 
leakage
MOV31ILG
r=1,33E-09  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=1,17E-05
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV31
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the MOV41
MOV41 FAIL
MOV41 Fail to close 
individual
MOV41FTC
q=1,07E-03
3
Q=1,07E-03
Common cause failure to 
close MOV41-MOV42
CCF2/2FTC41-42
q=1,03E-04
3
Q=1,03E-04
Common cause failure to 
close MOV41-MOV43
CCF2/2FTCV41-43
q=1,03E-04
3
Q=1,03E-04
Common cause failure to 
close MOV41-MOV44
CCF2/2FTC41-44
q=1,03E-04
3
Q=1,03E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV41
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the MOV42
MOV42 FAIL
MOV42 Fail to close 
individual
MOV42FTC
q=1,07E-03
3
Q=1,07E-03
Common cause failure to 
close MOV41-MOV42
CCF2/2FTC41-42
q=1,03E-04
3
Q=1,03E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV42
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the MOV43
MOV43 FAIL
MOV43 Fail to close 
individual
MOV43FTC
q=1,07E-03
3
Q=1,07E-03
Common cause failure to 
close MOV41-MOV43
CCF2/2FTCV41-43
q=1,03E-04
3
Q=1,03E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV43
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ISLOCA P-4
Failure of the MOV44
VM-EG-51B FAIL
MOV44 Fail to close 
individual
MOV44FTC
q=1,07E-03
3
Q=1,07E-03
Common cause failure to 
close MOV41-MOV44
CCF2/2FTC41-44
q=1,03E-04
3
Q=1,03E-04
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB FAILURE MOV44
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ISLOCA P-1
ISLOCA P-1
Pressurization of the line 
of the penetration P-1
PRESLPENETR P-1
Failure of the de-
energized MOV12
MOV12 FAIL
FAILURE MOV12
Failure of the de-
energized MOV MOV13
MOV13 FAIL
FAILURE MOV13
Failure of the MOV11 or 
failure of the pressure 
intrutement IP11
FAIL MOV11/IP11
Failure of the pressure 
intrutement IP11
IP11 FAIL
FAILURE IP11
Failure of the MOV11
MOV11 FAIL
FAILURE MOV11
RV11 Fail to open
RV11FTO
q=2,47E-03
3
Q=2,47E-03
Pump rupture P-1
RUPT P-1
q=1,00E+00
3
Q=1,00E+00
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB ISLOCA P-1
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ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
Failure of one of the three  
pathways identical P-
2.0/2.1
FAIL PW1/3 P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the pathway 1 P
-2.0/2.1
FAIL PW 1 P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve  
CV22
CV22 FAIL
FAILURE CV22
Failure of the check valve  
CV25
CV25 FAIL
FAILURE CV25
Failure of the pathway 2 P
-2.0/2.1
FAIL PW 2 P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve  
CV23
CV23 FAIL
FAILURE CV23
Failure of the check valve   
CV26
CV26 FAIL
FAILURE CV26
Failure of the pathway 3 P
-2.0/2.1
FAIL PW 3 P-2.0/2.1
Failure of the check valve  
CV24
CV24 FAIL
FAILURE CV24
Failure of the check valve  
CV27
CV27 FAIL
FAILURE CV27
Failure of one of the  
pathways going outside of  
containment
P-2.0/2.1 FAIL
Failure of the pathway  
going through P-2.0
FAIL PW P-2.0
Failure of the check valve  
CV20
CV20 FAIL
FAILURE CV20
The relief valve RV20  
opens
RV20RVO
q=1,00E+00
3
Q=1,00E+00
Failure of the pathway  
going through P-2.1
FAIL PW P-2.1
Failure of the check valve  
CV21
CV21 FAIL
FAILURE CV21
The relief valve RV21  
opens
RV21RVO
q=1,00E+00
3
Q=1,00E+00
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB ISLOCA P-2.0/2.1
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ISLOCA P-3
ISLOCA P-3
Failure of one of the two 
pathways P-3
FAIL PW 1/2 P-3
Failure of the pathway 1 P
-3
FAIL PW 1 P-3
Failure of the check valve 
CV33
CV33 FAIL
FAILURE CV33
Failure of the check valve 
CV31
CV31 FAIL
FAILURE CV31
Failure of the pathway 2 P
-3
FAIL PW 2 P-3
Failure of the check valve 
CV32
CV32 FAIL
FAILURE CV32
Failure of the check valve 
CV34
CV34 FAIL
FAILURE CV34
Leakage outside 
containment P-3
RUPTURE P-3
Leakage through the relief 
valve P-3
RUPTLBP P-3
The relief valve RV31 
opens
RV31RVO
q=1,00E+00
3
Q=1,00E+00
Failure of the de-
energized MOV31
MOV31 FAIL
FAILURE MOV31
MOV31 Large external 
leakage
MOV31ELG
r=9,84E-10  
Tm=8,76E+03
4
Q=8,62E-06
12/02/2015 13:53:37 ISLOCA REPORT JB ISLOCA P-3
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ISLOC A P-4
ISLOC A P-4
Pres s uriz at ion of  the line  
of  the penetrat ion P-4
IE P-4
F ailure of  one of  the  
pathw ay s
F AIL 1/3 PW  BT
F ailure of  the pathw ay  1 P-
4
F AIL PW  1 P-4
T B42 T herm al Barrier  
rupture
T B42 F AIL
r=1 ,9 3 E-04 
Tm=1 ,0 0 E+00
4
Q =1 ,9 3 E-04
F ailure of  the M OV42 or  
failure of  the f low  
int rutem ent  F I42
F AIL M OV42/F I42
F ailure of  the M OV42
M OV42 F AIL
F AILU R E M OV42
F ailure of  the f low  
int rutem ent  F I42
F I42 F AIL
F AILU R E F I42
F ailure of  the pathw ay  2 P-
4
F AIL PW  2 P-4
T B43 T herm al Barrier  
rupture
T B43 F AIL
r=1 ,9 3 E-04 
Tm=1 ,0 0 E+00
4
Q =1 ,9 3 E-04
F ailure of  the M OV43 or  
failure of  the f low  
int rutem ent  IF 43
F AIL M OV43/IF 43
F ailure of  the M OV43
M OV43 F AIL
F AILU R E M OV43
F ailure of  the f low  
int rutem ent  IF 43
IF 43 F AIL
F AILU R E F I43
F ailure of  the pathw ay  3 P-
4
F AIL PW  3 P-4
F ailure of  the M OV44 or  
failure of  the f low  
int rutem ent  IF 44
F AIL M OV44/IF 44
F ailure of  the M OV44
VM -EG-51B F AIL
F AILU R E M OV44
F ailure of  the f low  
int rutem ent  IF 44
IF 44 F AIL
F AILU R E F I44
T B44 T herm al Barrier  
rupture
T B44 F AIL
r=1 ,9 3 E-04 
Tm=1 ,0 0 E+00
4
Q =1 ,9 3 E-04
F ailure of  the M OV41or  
failure of  the f low  
ins t rum ent  IP41
F AIL M OV41/IP41
F ailure of  the M OV41
M OV41 F AIL
F AILU R E M OV41
F ailure of  the f low  
int rutem ent   F I41
F I41 F AIL
F AILU R E F I41
Pipe rupture P-4
R U PT  P-4
q =6 ,6 0 E-01
3
Q =6 ,6 0 E-01
12/02/2015 13:53:38 ISLOCA REPORT JB ISLOCA P-4
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ISLOCA P-5
ISLOCA P-5
Pipe rupture  P-5
RUPT P-5
q=6,60E-01
3
Q=6,60E-01
Pressurization of one of 
the three pathways P-5
PRES 1/3LAZO P-5
Failure of the pathway 1 P
-5
FAIL PW 1 P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV51
CV51 FAIL
FAILURE CV51
Failure of the check valve 
CV54
CV54 FAIL
FAILURE CV54
TB42 Thermal Barrier 
rupture
TB42 FAIL
r=1,93E-04 
Tm =1,00E+00
4
Q=1,93E-04
Relief valve RV51 Fails to 
open
RV51FTO
q=2,47E-03
3
Q=2,47E-03
Failure of the pathway 2 P
-5
FAIL PW 2 P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV52
CV52 FAIL
FAILURE CV52
Failure of the check valve 
CV55
CV55 FAIL
FAILURE CV55
TB43 Thermal Barrier 
rupture
TB43 FAIL
r=1,93E-04 
Tm =1,00E+00
4
Q=1,93E-04
Relief valve RV52 Fails to 
open
RV52FTO
q=2,47E-03
3
Q=2,47E-03
Failure of the pathway 3 P
-5
FAIL PW 3 P-5
Failure of the check valve 
CV53
CV53 FAIL
FAILURE CV53
Failure of the check valve 
CV56
CV56 FAIL
FAILURE CV56
TB44 Thermal Barrier 
rupture
TB44 FAIL
r=1,93E-04 
Tm =1,00E+00
4
Q=1,93E-04
Relief valve RV53 Fails to 
open
RV53FTO
q=2,47E-03
3
Q=2,47E-03
12/02/2015 13:53:38 ISLOCA REPORT JB ISLOCA P-5
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